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We develop and present a quantum cryptography concept in which phase determinations are made
from the time that a photon is detected, as opposed to where the photon is detected, and hence is a
non-interferometric process. The phase-encoded quantum information is contained in temporal and
polarization superpositions of single photon states, forming a complex qudit of Hilbert dimension
D ≥ 4. Based on this, we have developed a new quantum key distribution protocol that allows the
generation of secret key in the presence of higher noise than is possible with other protocols.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk, 42.50.Dv
Bennett and Brassard proved the merit of Weisner’s
quantum cryptography (QC) foundations [1] in 1984 with
their presentation of the first mature quantum key distri-
bution (QKD) protocol known as BB84 [2], which they
experimentally demonstrated in 1989 [3]. Their protocol
relies on transmission of a single photon onto a quan-
tum communication channel by one party, Alice, to her
partner with whom she wishes to share a secret, Bob.
The original scheme encodes information on a photon
by preparing it in one of four definite polarizations: a hor-
izontal or vertical polarized photon |h〉 or |v〉 (h or v), or a
left- or right-diagonal polarized photon |d¯〉 = (h− v)/√2
or |d〉 = (h+v)/√2 (d¯ or d) (the early BB84 polarization
protocol was investigated in fiber [4, 5]). As the photons
arrive to Bob, he randomly measures their polarizations
in one of the two preparation bases, h-v or d-d¯. Half
the time Bob measures the arriving states in the wrong
basis giving random, meaningless results, but the other
half of Bob’s measurements are in the transmitted basis,
determining the polarizations (bit values) of the arriving
photons. Once the information exchange is complete Bob
publicly reveals the times of his observations and his mea-
surement basis. Alice then publicly notifies Bob which of
his measurements were in the wrong basis and he dis-
cards that half of his bits to complete the sifting process.
Bob and Alice then remove errors through a reconcilia-
tion protocol [6, 7, 8, 9], and the exchange of the secret
is completed through application of privacy amplification
procedures [6, 8, 10]. At a minimum, QC requires a QKD
protocol, with sifting, reconciliation and privacy amplifi-
cation protocols, but more procedures, such as signature
authentication, may be required to ensure provable secu-
rity.
Bennett extended QC to fiber-based phase-encoding
schemes in 1992 [11] when he showed that QKD could
be effected through use of a pair of Franson’s unbalanced
Mach-Zehneder interferometers (MZIs) [12]. Fiber based
BB84 phase-encoding QKD protocols typically encode
photons with one of four phases, φi = 0, pi, pi/2, or 3pi/2,
and bit values are determined as 0 or 1 when Bob ran-
domly adds a phase of 0 or pi/2 to arriving photons, e.g.,
∆φ = 0 ≡ 0, and ∆φ = pi ≡ 1, (see [13]). The basis
choice remains random yielding a theoretical protocol ef-
ficiency of ηp = 1/2 in a polarization switched system
[14].
In this manuscript we develop a QKD concept in which
Bob transmits a temporal superposition of BB84 polar-
ization states to Alice through an unbalanced MZI. For
her part, Alice encodes phase information on the the ar-
riving states with a phase shift of φi = 0 or pi and then
returns them to Bob. The polarization, phase and time
encoding causes a complex qudit of high Hilbert dimen-
sion, allowing Bob to determine some phase-differences
from the timing of photon detections, without entangle-
ment or interferometric phase determination, to create a
QC protocol of high efficiency and improved security.
The complex qudit presents with a high disturbance to
eavesdropping, and maximizes the number of phase dif-
ferences Bob can determine, which reduces the informa-
tion an eavesdropper, Eve, can acquire. The reduction
in information leakage implies that Bob and Alice can
tolerate a higher error rate than presently known QKD
protocols and still share a secret [15, 16]. The protocol is
enabled by the encoding of four random phases of 0 or pi
on the temporal and polarization superpositions, of the
BB84 polarization states, through a phase-gate switch
that breaks the Faraday mirror symmetry used in plug-
and-play QKD [17, 18, 19].
Figure 1 presents Bob’s optics. His photon source is
typically an attenuated laser source, but for the sake of
argument we consider ideal single photon QKD. In this
approach, a photon emitted from the source first encoun-
ters the polarization controller adjusted to transmit h.
Next, the first polarizing beamsplitter (PBS1) transmits
h toward the 45◦ Faraday rotator, F̂45, whose operation
rotates h to d. Following F̂45 is Ĥ0 that, when the photon
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is traveling this direction, causes a 45◦ half-wave retarda-
tion that rotates d back to h: Ĥ0|d〉 = h = Ĥ0F̂45|h〉 = h,
but when the photon returns, F̂45Ĥ0|h〉 = v, causing pho-
tons returning on this path to reflect to SPCM1. This h
state is then superposed at the 50-50 beamsplitter (BS),
with one superposition traveling the longer upper arm,
and the other the shorter lower arm of the unbalanced
MZI. The upper arm includes Ĥ1 that causes a 90
◦ half-
wave retardation that rotates h to v: Ĥ1|h〉 = v, and
Ĥ1|v〉 = −h on the returning photons. The unbalanced
MZI is completed with PBS2 that transmits h and re-
flects v such that exiting the unbalanced MZI onto the
quantum channel from Bob to Alice is Ψ0, a dim-pulse
superposition of v delayed by ∆t following h,
Ψ0 = |h〉g(τ)√
2
+ i|v〉g(τ +∆t)√
2
⇔
[
1
0
]
g(τ)√
2
+
[
0
i
]
g(τ+∆t)√
2
,
where i is the phase shift resulting from reflection from
the BS, τ = t + z/c − t′ is the relative time from the
beginning of Bob’s transmission (the beginning of trans-
mission is often heralded by Bob to Alice with a bright
timing pulse at t′), ∆t relates the length difference of the
MZI short and long arms and is chosen long enough to
allow operation of the Pockels cells (PCs) on both su-
perpositions of Ψ0 [20], g(τ) = e
iωτδ(τ), δ(τ) is a narrow
envelope function with temporal width much greater that
1/ω but less than ∆t, and c is the photon group velocity.
Assume the PCs transform the states as follows, where
we choose αi = 0,±pi/4, or pi/2 to leave h or v unchanged,
or to transform h to d, d¯ or v, or to transform v to d,
d¯ or h. Consider the general case in which Bob applies
rotation α1 to the early h, and rotation α2 to the late
v so that after the PCs Bob has prepared superposition
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FIG. 1: Bob’s optical system includes a single photon source,
two single photon counting modules (SPCMs), two polarizing
beamsplitters (PBSs), a 45◦ Faraday rotator ( bF45), two fixed-
angle half-wave retarders ( bH0 and bH1), a 50-50 beamsplitter
(BS), and two Pockels cells (PC1 and PC2).
ΨB and sent it on to Alice:
ΨB =
[
cosα1
sinα1
]
g(τ)√
2
+ i
[ − sinα2
cosα2
]
g(τ+∆t)√
2
.
Figure 2 shows Alice’s optics [21]. As ΨB arrives, her
polarization controller corrects for the polarization ro-
tations caused by the quantum channel, usually single-
mode fiber, and her PBS then causes a spatial superpo-
sition of the arriving polarizations to form. For example,
h positions of ΨB pass directly to phase modulator PM,
and the v positions reflect downward. The h position of
the first (earliest) temporal superposition encounters the
PM first, and a phase φ1 = 0 or pi is added before it passes
to ĤA, which rotates it to v; the downward reflected v po-
sition first passes through ĤA and is rotated to −h, and
it is then given phase φ2 = 0 or pi as it passes through the
PM; next, these two phase-modulated and polarization-
switched superpositions recombine at the PBS at the ear-
liest time position. A similar process occurs to the ih
and iv positions of the later temporal position. That is,
the ih polarization passes directly through the PBS to
the PM that adds phase φ3 = 0 or pi to the position,
and it is then rotated to iv by ĤA; the iv position is
reflected downward by the PBS, rotated to −ih by ĤA,
and given φ4 = 0 or pi by the PM; the phase-modulated
and polarization-switched superpositions then recombine
at the PBS at the latest time position of the temporal su-
perposition to form ΨA,
ΨA =
[−eiφ2 sinα1
eiφ1 cosα1
]
g(τ)√
2
− i
[
eiφ4 cosα2
eiφ3 sinα2
]
g(τ+∆t)√
2
,
which Alice directs toward the polarization controller.
The controller then inverts its earlier rotations before di-
recting the temporal, polarization, and phase modulated
qudit onto the quantum channel to Bob. It is a subtle
point, but, if Bob sent to Alice a state that includes a
d or d¯ within the superposition, after passing through
the phase-gate switch that position appears to have been
reflected back to him from a mirror: d 7→ d¯ and d¯ 7→ d.
However, if his superpositions included v or h, those posi-
tions will appear to have been switched, in his coordinate
PBS
HA
PM
Ψ
Β
Ψ
Α
Polarization
  Controller
FIG. 2: Alice’s optical system is a phase-gate switch that
includes an actively aligned polarization controller and a PBS
followed by a loop with one phase modulator (PM), and a 90◦
half-wave retarder, bHA [21]. This phase gated switch does not
rotate the polarizations 90◦ as a Faraday mirror in plug-and-
play [17, 18, 19].
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system: h 7→ v and v 7→ h. In contrast, if Alice’s optics
behaved as a Faraday mirror, e.g., the operations on the
states effect a 90◦ rotation in all cases: h 7→ ±v, d 7→ ±d¯,
v 7→ ∓h, and d¯ 7→ ∓d, from Bob’s perspective.
As ΨA arrives to Bob, he appropriately modulates his
two PCs to select α3 and α4 to determine most of the
phases Alice has added to the h and v polarizations to
form the generalized state, Ψ′B after his PCs and prior
to PBS2:
Ψ′B = −
[
eiφ2 sinα1 cosα3 + e
iφ1 cosα1 sinα3
eiφ2 sinα1 sinα3 − eiφ1 cosα1 cosα3
]
g(τ)√
2
− i
[
eiφ4 cosα2 cosα4 − eiφ3 sinα2 sinα4
eiφ4 cosα2 sinα4 + e
iφ3 sinα2 cosα4
]
g(τ+∆t)√
2
.
Then, as Ψ′B enters the MZI, PBS2 superposes the early
and late time positions, based on polarizations, to form
yet another temporal superposition. For example, at
the earliest time position the h position passes directly
through to time τ+0, and the v position travels the upper
arm to time τ +∆t; similarly, at the latest time position
the h positions pass directly through to time τ +∆t, and
the v position travels the upper arm to time τ + 2∆t.
The photon will be detected on coherence at one of these
three times, on one of the two SPCMs, based on Bob’s
decoding operations.
To complete a QKD protocol, we consider three gen-
eral classes of PC rotations. The first class is when
Bob chooses (α1, α2) = (0, 0), (0, pi/2), (pi/2, 0), or
(pi/2, pi/2). In this situation, Bob can overlap and in-
terfere his states with efficiency η = 1 at time τ +∆t by
choosing (α3, α4) = (α1, α2) to determine ∆φ41, ∆φ31,
∆φ42, and ∆φ32, respectively, on one of his two SPCMs.
After Bob makes these phase difference determinations
he notifies Alice of the relative time τ (the absolute time
that includes ∆t is not needed) of the observation and
his measurement basis (∆φ41, ∆φ31, ∆φ42, or ∆φ32).
The second class is when Bob chooses (α1, α2) =
(0, pi/4), (pi/2, pi/4), (0,−pi/4), (pi/2,−pi/4), (−pi/4, 0),
(−pi/4, pi/2), (pi/4, 0), or (pi/4, pi/2). In these situations,
Bob chooses α3 = pi/2 if α1 = 0, and α3 = 0 if α1 = pi/2,
to cause an early-time coherence of h or v of his super-
position to randomly trigger either SPCM1 or SPCM2 at
the earliest possible detection time τ + 0, without inter-
ference and no phase difference determination. Similarly,
Bob chooses α4 = pi/2 if α2 = 0, and α4 = 0 if α2 = pi/2,
to cause a late-time coherence of ih or iv of his super-
position to randomly trigger either SPCM1 or SPCM2
at the latest possible detection time τ + 2∆t, without
interference or any phase determination. In the first sit-
uation (early-time h or v transmission, i.e., α1 = 0 or
pi/2), Bob chooses α4 = pi/4, and in the latter situation
(late-time ih or iv transmission) Bob chooses α3 = pi/4.
Bob ignores the 1/2 of these detections that are random
as they convey no phase information. For the remain-
ing cases Bob finds with η = 1/2 that the polarization
of his photon, and thus the time of an observation, de-
pends on ∆φ21 or ∆φ43, respectively, and he notifies Al-
ice of the relative time τ of his detection and the mea-
surement basis. For example, consider that Bob chose
(α1, α2, α3, α4) = (0, pi/4, pi/2, pi/4). This gives
Ψ′B = −
[
eiφ1
0
]
g(τ)√
2
− i
[
eiφ4 − eiφ3
eiφ4 + eiφ3
]
g(τ +∆t)
2
√
2
prior to PBS2 demonstrating that the earliest detections
after Ψ′B passes through the MZI are indeterminate, but
any detection on any SPCM at time τ + ∆t determines
that ∆φ43 = ±pi, and that a detection on any SPCM
at time τ + 2∆t determines that ∆φ43 = 0. Thus, Bob
determines Alice’s phase differences by when he detected
a photon, the time of the event, rather than where he
detected a photon, or interferometric determination [22].
The third class to consider is when Bob chooses
(α1, α2) = (pi/4, pi/4), (pi/4,−pi/4), (−pi/4, pi/4), or
(−pi/4,−pi/4). This class is similar to the second in
that he determines phase differences based on the time
of detections rather than by interferometric means. He
chooses his rotations to determine ∆φ21 at time τ + 0,
and ∆φ43 at time τ + 2∆t with efficiency η = 1/2.
For example, suppose that Bob chose (α1, α2, α3, α4) =
(pi/4,−pi/4, pi/4, pi/4). This gives
Ψ′B = −
[
eiφ2 + eiφ1
eiφ2 − eiφ1
]
g(τ)
2
√
2
− i
[
eiφ4 + eiφ3
eiφ4 − eiφ3
]
g(τ +∆t)
2
√
2
prior to PBS2. Detections at time τ+0 determine ∆φ21 =
0, and detections at time τ +2∆t determine ∆φ43 = ±pi,
while detections at time τ+∆t are not determined, or are
effectively random [22]. As usual, Bob notifies Alice of
the relative time τ and phase basis of his determination.
With these physics Bob and Alice build a QKD pro-
tocol that allows determination of ∆φ21, ∆φ31, ∆φ41,
∆φ32, ∆φ42, or ∆φ43. The protocol is most easily bal-
anced by Bob sending one of the (h, ih), (h, iv), (v, ih),
or (v, iv) states as often as he sends any of the remain-
ing twelve polarization combinations giving ηp = 0.75,
but Alice and Bob could also balance the protocol by ex-
tending the class-two and class-three degrees of freedom,
with a lower ηp, by choosing α3 and α4 to interferometri-
cally determine ∆φ31, ∆φ32, ∆φ41, or ∆φ42 with η = 1/2
at time τ +∆t.
A complete error analysis of this protocol will evalu-
ate the qudit security against individual [23], coherent
[24, 25, 26], and cloning [27, 28, 29] attacks. These at-
tacks consider the Hilbert dimension D and the number
of conjugate bases. For our case, Bob has prepared and
sent a qudit ΨB with D = 4, which was shown in [15, 16]
that it can be secure for disturbances of up to 25% [30].
As Bob’s qudit arrives Alice then switches the polariza-
tions and adds four phases to the qudit prior to its return
to Bob, increasing the allowable disturbance further.
These strong attacks typically require Eve to store her
probe until after Bob and Alice publicly announce their
measurement basis, implying that if Alice and Bob sim-
ply encrypt their sifting communications, or even simply
wait some time to sift their quantum communication,
3
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that they can guard against these attacks. Neverthe-
less, these strategies define the strictest bounds on the
key rates of QKD protocols against generalized attacks.
Upon defeat, however, a reasonable attack by Eve is the
intercept-resend strategy, and it should be evaluated as
well.
Due to the number of degrees of freedom in the qu-
dit, Alice and Bob have many choices that have all been
shown to be more secure against eavesdropping [15, 16].
They could even effect free-space QKD [3, 31, 32, 33, 34]
with Bob’s qudit alone, with enhanced security and
equivalent efficiency as BB84.
In summary, we have developed and analyzed three
physics concepts that enhance the security of quantum
cryptography. First, we developed (Bob’s) optics that
exploit polarization and time encoding to form a complex
qudit with D = 4, which presents with a high tolerance
to eavesdropping. Next, we fashion a phase-gate switch
that breaks the plug-and-play Faraday mirror symmetry
by switching incident polarizations in a manner that al-
lows addition of a single relative phase to arriving polar-
ization superpositions, increasing the security of the qu-
dit further against eavesdropping. Finally, we presented
the complex qudit realization of differential phase deter-
mination without interferometric means. These elements
can be used to establish a QKD protocol that exploits
time, phase, and polarization encoding, providing signif-
icantly improved immunity to errors, and some of the
elements may have broader uses in the general quantum
information field. In addition, the security check is better
than any other protocol described to date. In our pre-
sentation, we have assumed a single photon source. In
the case of a weak coherent source, the security will of
course be reduced as in all QKD systems.
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